

About project of national standard
«Protocol of IoT for the interchanging data in
narrowband spectrum (NB-Fi)»
(brief cryptanalysis)

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About

17 April, 2018 TC 194 announced the first version of national standard «Protocol of IoT for the interchanging data in narrowband spectrum (NB-Fi)».

What is that?

It is technology which is designed for the low-power, wide-area, machine-to-machine communication, with the using the narrow band approach.



Structure of package

Таблица 4 – Структура формата UPLINK-пакета

Preamble (Преамбула)				Node ID (Идентификатор, присвоенный устройству)				Data (Данные)				Error detection and correction (Определение ошибки и коррекция)				
								Header (Заголовок)				Payload (Полезные данные)	Payload CRC (Контрольная сумма полезных данных)	Packet CRC (Контрольная сумма пакета данных)		Zigzag code
0x97	0x15	0x7a	0x6f	ID2	ID1	ID0	7	6	5	4 – 0	8 байт			CRC-8	CRC-32	
								SYS	ACK	MULTI		ITER	Zigzag source (16 байт)			

Таблица 5 – Структура поля данных транспортного уровня DOWNLINK-пакета

Идентификатор, присвоенный устройству (Node ID)			Данные (Data)				Полезные данные (Payload)
			Заголовок (Header)				
ID2	ID1	ID0	7	6	5	4 – 0	от 8 до 128 байт
			SYS	ACK	MULTI	ITER	



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- 4 Authentication is provided by CRC-8 in Uplink package (Downlink.. hmm...);
- 5 Length of Payload is 8 byte, but length of the block in XTEA-2 is 16 byte...



Old-school meet-in-the-middle

Let $F_K = E_{K_2}(E_{K_1}(P))$, where E_k - block cipher, $K = K_1 || K_2$,
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- 3 for each pair (K_1, K_2) verify equation $F_{(K_1, K_2)}(P_2) = C_2$.

Totally we have $3 \cdot 2^{128}$.



We have Magma

Block cipher	block	Key	Security	GE	Speed
Magma	64	256	$2^{192} - 2^{224}$	1.017	200
XTEA-2	128	128	$3 \cdot 2^{129}$	6.980	28.2



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 - there is no CRC in Downlink, therefore any package will be accepted.
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- 3 Bruteforce attack
 - for forging new Uplink it is enough 256 attempts.



The End

There is no crypto without thinking.

Thank you for your attention!

