

Fuzzy extractors security under several models of biometric data

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Biometric data are unique for each person,
BUT there are certain difficulties while using them.

Difficulties

- 1 unstable input data
- 2 low entropy of output bit string
- 3 how to store the template safely?

Input data instability \Rightarrow errors of type I (False Rejection) and type II (False Acceptance).

Fuzzy extractor




Figure 1: Fuzzy extractor

\mathcal{M} – metric space with metric ρ
 U_l – random variable with uniform distribution over $\{0, 1\}^l$

$$H_\infty(A) = -\log_2(\max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \Pr(A = a))$$

$$SD(A, B) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} |\Pr(A = a) - \Pr(B = a)|$$

$(\mathcal{M}, m, l, t, \varepsilon)$ -fuzzy extractor – a pair of functions (Gen, Rep):

- 1 Gen[w] = $\langle s, q \rangle$, where $w \in \mathcal{M}$, $s \in \{0, 1\}^l$, $q \in \{0, 1\}^*$.
- 2 Rep[w', q] = $s \Leftrightarrow \rho(w, w') \leq t$, $w' \in \mathcal{M}$.
- 3 **Security property.**

If for a random variable W over \mathcal{M} it holds true that $H_\infty(W) \geq m$ and Gen[W] = $\langle s, q \rangle$, then $SD(\langle s, q \rangle, \langle U_l, q \rangle) \leq \varepsilon$.

Fuzzy extractor scheme based on XOR operation:

- $\text{Gen}[w] = \langle s, q \rangle$, where $s \in_R \{0, 1\}^m$, $q = w \oplus C[s]$;
- $\text{Rep}[w', q] = D[w' \oplus q] = D[w' \oplus w \oplus C[s]] = s$, if $\rho[w, w'] \leq 1$.

$\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^n$, ρ – Hamming metric

$C[\cdot]$ – coding function of Hamming code

$D[\cdot]$ – corresponding decoding function

$w, w' \in \mathcal{M}$ – biometric parameter feature vectors

s – fuzzy extractor secret string

q – fuzzy extractor public (helper) string

- Xavier Boyen, “*Reusable cryptographic fuzzy extractors*”, 2004.
- Koen Simoens, Pim Tuyls, Bart Preneel, “*Privacy weaknesses in biometric sketches*”, 2009.

Main questions

- 1 What is the distribution of biometric data?
- 2 How can an attacker use knowledge about biometric data distribution?

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Goal

Study real-life security of a fuzzy extractor scheme based on XOR operation.

- 1 Independent non-equiprobable bits with known parameter $p \neq 1/2$.
- 2 Bits form a stationary Markov chain with known matrix of transition probabilities.

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Description of biometric vectors database for AT&T Database:
39 persons – from 5 to 15 vectors for each person – 377 vectors – length 130592 bits

Feature extraction with *Local binary patterns (LBP)* algorithm

Vector length after transformation – 75 bits.

Table 1: Evaluation of probabilities to take the value 1 for several bits.

i	$P(w_i) = 1$	i	$P(w_i) = 1$	i	$P(w_i) = 1$	i	$P(w_i) = 1$
0	0.335677	8	0.514310	16	0.491613	24	0.487495
1	0.529562	9	0.504790	17	0.513379	25	0.483415
2	0.525382	10	0.457895	18	0.500390	26	0.479505
3	0.533092	11	0.493051	19	0.493090	27	0.507518
4	0.403864	12	0.482903	20	0.502562	28	0.485082
5	0.501710	13	0.478931	21	0.498690	29	0.504567
6	0.487790	14	0.479208	22	0.500526	30	0.487244
7	0.488562	15	0.5013541	23	0.473223	31	0.491690

Table 2: Searching for stationary Markov chains.

Person	Bits sequences
1	[58-60]
2	[61-63]
7	[63-65]
9	[18-20], [63-65]
13	[28-30], [33-36], [46-48], [49-51], [53-56], [57-60], [61-63], [63-65], [66-68], [71-73]
23	[58-60], [71-73]
24	[36-38], [66-68]
25	[52-54], [72-74]
26	[28-30], [30-32], [41-43], [61-63], [65-67], [68-70], [69-72], [71-73], [72-74]

State of problem

$$q = w \oplus C[s]$$

we know

we know distribution

we want to know

Independent non-equiprobable bits

For the sake of certainty $p < \frac{1}{2}$, $g = 1 - p$.

n – biometric parameter length, $N = 2^n$.

$$\Pr(w^1) \geq \Pr(w^2) \geq \dots \geq \Pr(w^N)$$

$$W^i = \{w \mid \text{wt}(w) = i\}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} w^1 = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 0) \\ w^2 = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 1) \\ w^3 = (0, 0, \dots, 1, 0) \\ \dots \\ w^{n+1} = (1, 0, \dots, 0, 0) \\ \dots \end{array} \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{)} \\ \text{)} \\ \text{)} \\ \text{)} \\ \text{)} \end{array} \begin{array}{l} W^0 \\ W^1 \end{array}$$

$$w \oplus q = C[s]$$

$$(0, 0, \dots, 0, 0) \oplus (q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n) = (q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n)$$

$$(0, 0, \dots, 0, 1) \oplus (q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n) = (q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n \oplus 1)$$

\vdots

$$(1, 1, \dots, 1, 1) \oplus (q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n) = (q_1 \oplus 1, q_2 \oplus 1, \dots, q_n \oplus 1)$$

$$w \oplus q = C[s]$$

$$(0, 0, \dots, 0, 0) \oplus (q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n) = (q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n) \quad \equiv s^1$$

$$(0, 0, \dots, 0, 1) \oplus (q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n) = (q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n \oplus 1) \quad \equiv s^2$$

$$\vdots$$
$$\vdots$$

$$(1, 1, \dots, 1, 1) \oplus (q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n) = (q_1 \oplus 1, q_2 \oplus 1, \dots, q_n \oplus 1) \quad \equiv s^N$$

$$\{s^j\} = \{0, 1\}^n \Rightarrow \exists j_0 : s^{j_0} = C[s]$$

Let's denote:

$$S^i = \{s \in \{s^j\} \mid s^j = q \oplus w^h, \text{wt}(w^h) = i\},$$

$$|S^i| = \binom{n}{i}, \forall i = 0, \dots, n.$$

Then

$$S^0 \cup S^1 \cup \dots \cup S^n = \{s^j\},$$

$$S^i \cap S^j = \emptyset, i \neq j.$$

Independent non-equiprobable bits

Consider only first r classes $S^0, S^1, \dots, S^{r-1} = \tilde{S}$ of vectors with maximum probabilities. Denote $M = \sum_{i=0}^{r-1} \binom{n}{i}$.

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{S} \quad & s^1 = (q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n) \\ & s^2 = (q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n \oplus 1) \\ & \dots \\ & s^M = (q_1 \oplus w_1^M, q_2 \oplus w_2^M, \dots, q_n \oplus w_n^M) \end{aligned}$$

$$s^{M+1} = (q_1 \oplus w_1^{M+1}, q_2 \oplus w_2^{M+1}, \dots, q_n \oplus w_n^{M+1})$$

...

$$s^N = (q_1 \oplus 1, q_2 \oplus 1, \dots, q_n \oplus 1)$$

K^i – the number of code words in class S^i

Lemma

$$K^i = \frac{\binom{n}{i-1} - K^{i-1} - K^{i-2} \cdot (n - (i - 2))}{i}, \quad \forall i = \overline{2, n}.$$

Independent non-equiprobable bits

$$\begin{aligned}
 R_1(M) = & \left(K^0 \cdot (g^n + \binom{n}{1} p^1 g^{n-1}) + \sum_{j=1}^r K^j \cdot (p^j g^{n-j} + \binom{j}{1} p^{j-1} g^{n-(j-1)} + \right. \\
 & \left. + \binom{n-j}{1} p^{j+1} g^{n-(j+1)}) \right)^{-1} \cdot \left[\left(1 - \left(K^0 (g^n + \binom{n}{1} p^1 g^{n-1}) + \right. \right. \right. \\
 & \left. \left. + \sum_{j=1}^r K^j (p^j g^{n-j} + \binom{j}{1} p^{j-1} g^{n-(j-1)} + \binom{n-j}{1} p^{j+1} g^{n-(j+1)}) \right) \right) \\
 & \cdot \left(\sum_{i=0}^r K^i (1+n) \right) + \left(K^0 (g^n + \binom{n}{1} p^1 g^{n-1}) + \sum_{j=1}^r \frac{\left(\sum_{i=1}^{j-1} K^i + 1 + \sum_{i=1}^j K^i \right)}{2} \right. \\
 & \left. \cdot K^j \cdot \left(p^j g^{n-j} + \binom{j}{1} p^{j-1} g^{n-(j-1)} + \binom{n-j}{1} p^{j+1} g^{n-(j+1)} \right) \right) \right].
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

Markov chain model

$P = \begin{pmatrix} p_{00} & p_{01} \\ p_{10} & p_{11} \end{pmatrix}$ – matrix of transition probabilities:

$p_{ij} = \Pr(x_r = i | x_{r-1} = j), i, j \in \{0, 1\}, \forall r \in \{1, 2, \dots\}$.

$F = \begin{pmatrix} f_{00} & f_{01} \\ f_{10} & f_{11} \end{pmatrix}$ – transition matrix of a chain sample:

f_{ij} – the number of transitions from state i to state j .

Markov chain model

- 1 Restore all possible transition matrices F for n steps.

\mathbf{f}_{00}	\mathbf{f}_{01}	\mathbf{f}_{10}	\mathbf{f}_{11}
f_{00}^1	f_{01}^1	f_{10}^1	f_{11}^1
f_{00}^2	f_{01}^2	f_{10}^2	f_{11}^2
f_{00}^3	f_{01}^3	f_{10}^3	f_{11}^3
...			

- 2 Evaluate the probability of a Markov chain sample with given transition matrix F .

\mathbf{f}_{00}	\mathbf{f}_{01}	\mathbf{f}_{10}	\mathbf{f}_{11}	\mathbf{Pr}
f_{00}^1	f_{01}^1	f_{10}^1	f_{11}^1	$\mathbf{Pr}(w_{F^1})$
f_{00}^2	f_{01}^2	f_{10}^2	f_{11}^2	$\mathbf{Pr}(w_{F^2})$
f_{00}^3	f_{01}^3	f_{10}^3	f_{11}^3	$\mathbf{Pr}(w_{F^3})$
...				...

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f_{00}^1	f_{01}^1	f_{10}^1	f_{11}^1	$\text{Pr}(w_{F^1})$
f_{00}^2	f_{01}^2	f_{10}^2	f_{11}^2	$\text{Pr}(w_{F^2})$
f_{00}^3	f_{01}^3	f_{10}^3	f_{11}^3	$\text{Pr}(w_{F^3})$
...				...

Markov chain model

- 8 Evaluate the number of Markov chain samples with given transition matrix F .

f_{00}	f_{01}	f_{10}	f_{11}	Pr	$N^{(n)}(F)$
f_{00}^1	f_{01}^1	f_{10}^1	f_{11}^1	$\text{Pr}(w_{F^1})$	$N^{(n)}(F^1)$
f_{00}^2	f_{01}^2	f_{10}^2	f_{11}^2	$\text{Pr}(w_{F^2})$	$N^{(n)}(F^2)$
f_{00}^3	f_{01}^3	f_{10}^3	f_{11}^3	$\text{Pr}(w_{F^3})$	$N^{(n)}(F^3)$
...					...

- 9 Sort the obtained set by probabilities to get the Markov chain samples with given transition matrix in descending order.

f_{00}	f_{01}	f_{10}	f_{11}	Pr	$N^{(n)}(F)$
$f_{00}^{t_1}$	$f_{01}^{t_1}$	$f_{10}^{t_1}$	$f_{11}^{t_1}$	$\text{Pr}(w_{F^{t_1}})$	$N^{(n)}(F^{t_1})$
$f_{00}^{t_2}$	$f_{01}^{t_2}$	$f_{10}^{t_2}$	$f_{11}^{t_2}$	$\text{Pr}(w_{F^{t_2}})$	$N^{(n)}(F^{t_2})$
$f_{00}^{t_3}$	$f_{01}^{t_3}$	$f_{10}^{t_3}$	$f_{11}^{t_3}$	$\text{Pr}(w_{F^{t_3}})$	$N^{(n)}(F^{t_3})$
...			

Markov chain model

- 3 Evaluate the number of Markov chain samples with given transition matrix F .

f_{00}	f_{01}	f_{10}	f_{11}	\Pr	$N^{(n)}(F)$
f_{00}^1	f_{01}^1	f_{10}^1	f_{11}^1	$\Pr(w_{F^1})$	$N^{(n)}(F^1)$
f_{00}^2	f_{01}^2	f_{10}^2	f_{11}^2	$\Pr(w_{F^2})$	$N^{(n)}(F^2)$
f_{00}^3	f_{01}^3	f_{10}^3	f_{11}^3	$\Pr(w_{F^3})$	$N^{(n)}(F^3)$
...					...

- 4 Sort the obtained set by probabilities to get the Markov chain samples with given transition matrix in descending order.

f_{00}	f_{01}	f_{10}	f_{11}	\Pr	$N^{(n)}(F)$
$f_{00}^{t_1}$	$f_{01}^{t_1}$	$f_{10}^{t_1}$	$f_{11}^{t_1}$	$\Pr(w_{F^{t_1}})$	$N^{(n)}(F^{t_1})$
$f_{00}^{t_2}$	$f_{01}^{t_2}$	$f_{10}^{t_2}$	$f_{11}^{t_2}$	$\Pr(w_{F^{t_2}})$	$N^{(n)}(F^{t_2})$
$f_{00}^{t_3}$	$f_{01}^{t_3}$	$f_{10}^{t_3}$	$f_{11}^{t_3}$	$\Pr(w_{F^{t_3}})$	$N^{(n)}(F^{t_3})$
...			

- 5 Compile the set of vectors $\{s^j\}$ to be searched in: for each transition matrix from the obtained set and the corresponding initial and final states, restore all possible vectors $\{w\}$ and XOR them with q .
- 6 Calculate the average amount of work.

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Markov chain model

M – size of high probable set

$N^{(n)}(F^t)$ – number of Markov chain samples with transition matrix F^t

Z – number of observed classes: $\sum_{t=1}^{Z-1} N^{(n)}(F^t) < M$, $\sum_{t=1}^Z N^{(n)}(F^t) \geq M$

Let's create a list γ :

$$\gamma[t] = N^{(n)}(F^t), \forall t = 1, \dots, Z - 1,$$
$$\gamma[Z] = \begin{cases} N^{(n)}(F^Z) & , \text{ if } \sum_{t=1}^Z N^{(n)}(F^t) = M \\ M - \sum_{t=1}^{Z-1} N^{(n)}(F^t) & , \text{ otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

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$$R_2(M, p_{00}, p_{11}) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^Z \Pr(F^i) \cdot \gamma[i] \right)^{-1} \left(M \cdot \left(1 - \sum_{i=1}^Z \Pr(F^i) \cdot \gamma[i] \right) + \sum_{i=1}^Z \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left(\sum_{j=1}^{i-1} \gamma[j] + 1 + \sum_{j=1}^i \gamma[j] \right) \cdot \gamma[i] \cdot \Pr(F^i) \right).$$

(2)

Evaluation of the average amount of work

r – number of observed vector classes

p_{00}, p_{11} – elements of Markov chain transition probabilities matrix

p_0^{st} – Bernoulli scheme parameter

$R_1(r, p_0^{st})$ – the average amount of work for Bernoulli scheme

$R_2(r, p_{00}, p_{11})$ – the average amount of work for Markov chain model

Table 3: Comparison of the results for two models. Non-truncated search.

$ w $	p_{00}	p_{11}	r	$R_2(r, p_{00}, p_{11})$	p_0^{st}	$R_1(r, p_0^{st})$
255	0.3	0.5	255	$2^{244.87\dots}$	0.4167	$2^{249.91\dots}$
255	0.3	0.6	255	$2^{242.99\dots}$	0.3636	$2^{244.88\dots}$
255	0.3	0.8	255	$2^{220.58\dots}$	0.2222	$2^{218.56\dots}$
255	0.4	0.5	255	$2^{250.91\dots}$	0.4545	$2^{252.28\dots}$
255	0.4	0.6	255	$2^{248.57\dots}$	0.4	$2^{248.56\dots}$
255	0.4	0.7	255	$2^{241.02\dots}$	0.3333	$2^{240.98\dots}$
255	0.4	0.8	255	$2^{225.86\dots}$	0.25	$2^{225.59\dots}$

Evaluation of the average amount of work

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Table 4: Comparison of the results for two models. Truncated search.

$ w $	p_{00}	p_{11}	r	$R_2(r, p_{00}, p_{11})$	p_0^{st}	$R_1(r, p_0^{st})$
255	0.3	0.5	55	$2^{216.08\dots}$	0.4167	$2^{224.76\dots}$
255	0.3	0.6	55	$2^{212.35\dots}$	0.3636	$2^{210.23\dots}$
255	0.3	0.8	55	$2^{188.43\dots}$	0.2222	$2^{188.72\dots}$
255	0.4	0.5	55	$2^{233.34\dots}$	0.4545	$2^{237.35\dots}$
255	0.4	0.6	55	$2^{219.93\dots}$	0.4	$2^{219.81\dots}$
255	0.4	0.7	55	$2^{200.68\dots}$	0.3333	$2^{203.52\dots}$
255	0.4	0.8	55	$2^{189.56\dots}$	0.25	$2^{191.20\dots}$

Evaluation of the average amount of work

R_1 – the average amount of work for Bernoulli scheme

R_2 – the average amount of work for Markov chain model




Figure 2: $(\log_2 R_1 - \log_2 R_2)$ for $n = 255$, non-truncated searching

- We've shown the low entropy of face biometric data. Our results correspond to the previous study of Ushmaev and Kuznetsov for fingerprint biometric data.
- We've studied the impact of statistical properties of biometric data on the security of fuzzy extractors.
- Observed effects should be taken into account while evaluating practical security of fuzzy extractor-based biometric identification systems.

Thank you for your attention!

Any questions?